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European human rights pluralism 
Notion and justification 
SAMANTHA BESSON 
The present volume sets itself the daunting, and somewhat presumptuous 
task of 'rethinking legal thinking'. This undertaking strikes us as particu-
larly difficult when transposed to the blooming field of international and 
European legal theory: after all, we are still having a hard time thinking 
about international and European law, so how can we be expected to be 
rethinking our legal thinking yet? At the same time, however, we also 
know that, when thinking about new forms oflaw developing outside the 
boundaries of the state, it is essential not to apply too hastily traditional 
conceptions and approaches in legal theory. Not only might those con-
ceptions not fit the practice of European and international law but, given 
the integrated nature of the European legal order and of parts of the inter-
national legal order, they might no longer fit that of domestic law either. 
Building this new boat on an open sea, to borrow an expression from 
Neurath and Habermas, may be a necessary project as a result, however 
difficult it may be. 1 
This chapter was written while a Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Germany) 
in 2011-12. It is a revised version of a paper I presented at the Rethinking Legal Think-
ing Conference, Centre of Excellence Foundations of the European Polity, University of 
Helsinki, 26-7 August 2010. Many thanks to Kaarlo Tuori for the invitation andto Julen 
Extabe for his comments. Last but not least, I would like to thank my research assistant 
Eleonor Kleber for her help with the editing of the chapter. 
1 See e.g. M. Giudice and K. Culver, 'Not a system but an order: explaining the legality of 
the European Union' in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations 
of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp 54-76; W. Walu-
chow, 'Legality's frontier: a review of Keith Culver and Michael Giudice, Legality's Bor-
ders: An Essay in General Jurisprudence', 1 Transnational Legal Theory 4 (2010), 575-85; 
S. Besson and J. Tasioulas, 'Introduction' in Besson and Tasioulas (eds), The Philoso-
phy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp 1-27; K. Culver and 
M. Giudice, Legality's Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 ); W. Twining, General 
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In this chapter, I would like to take the title of the volume to imply 
primarily a change of perspective in legal theory; a change of perspective 
that is important if one wants to embrace the most difficult issues in 
international and European legal theory, issues that seem to be resisting 
existing paradigms in traditional legal theory. My topic pertains to the 
now famous (or infamous) idea of legal pluralism in European and inter-
national legal theory, i.e. the idea that not all legal norms applicable in a 
given legal order ought to be regarded as validated by reference to the same 
criteria and hence as situated within a hierarchy, and that, accordingly, 
some normative conflicts may get no legal answer as a result.2 
Importantly, however, I will try to look at the question oflegal plural-
ism from a different perspective: that of human rights law in the context 
of human rights legal theory. This new focus is particularly topical as it is 
in the human rights context that most authors endorsing one form or the 
other of legal pluralism see evidence to support their view. They either 
understand human rights pluralism as a case of legal pluralism,3 and 
Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2009); S. Besson, 'How international is the European legal order?', No Founda-
tions 5 (2008), available at www.helsinki.fi/nofo/; S. Besson, 'The concept of constitution-
alism in Europe: interpretation in lieu of translation', No Foundations 4 (2007), available at 
www.helsinki.fi/nofo/; N. Walker, 'Legal theory and the European Union', 25 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies4 (2005), 581-601at592. 
2 See e.g. G. Davies, 'Constitutional disagreement in Europe and the search for pluralism' in 
M. Avbelj and J, Komarek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), pp 269-83; M. Maduro, 'Three claims of constitutional 
pluralism' in ibid., pp 67-84; S. Besson, 'The truth about legal pluralism: a review of Nico 
Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism', 8 European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2012 ), 354-61; 
N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); S. Besson, 'European legal pluralism after Kadt, 5 European 
Constitutional Law Review 2 (2009), 237-64; N. Krisch, The Case for Pluralism in Postna-
tional Law (London: LSE Legal Studies Working Papers, 2009); J. Baquero Cruz, 'The legacy 
of the Maastricht-Urteil and the pluralist movement', 14 European Law Journal 4 (2008), 
389-422 at 397-403; Besson, 'How international', note 1 above; M. Maduro, 'Interpret-
ing European law: judicial adjudication in a context of constitutional pluralism', European 
Journal of Legal Studies 1 (2007); N. Barber, 'Legal pluralism and the European Union', 
12 European Law Journal 3 (2006), 306-29; M. Kumm, 'The jurisprudence of constitutional 
conflict: constitutional supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty', 
11 European Law Journal 3 (2005), 262-307; M. Maduro, 'Contrapunctual law: Europe's 
constitutional pluralism in action', in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003), pp 501-37; N. Walker, 'The idea of constitutional plural-
ism', 65 Modern Law Review 3 (2002), 317-59; N. MacCormick, 'The Maastricht-Urtei1: 
sovereignty now', 1 European Law Journal 3 (1995), 259-66 at 259. 
3 See e.g. N. Krisch, 'The open architecture of European human rights law', 71 Modern Law 
Review 2 (2008), 183-216; Maduro, 'Three claims', note 2 above. 
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sometimes even as the only case they can think of, 4 or envisage human 
rights as a solution to the more widespread phenomenon oflegal plural-
ism, for instance in judicial settlements of normative conflicts. 5 Against 
this new trend in European and international legal scholarship,6 how-
ever, I will argue that human rights plurality certainly exists through the 
coexistence of multilevel human rights norms and judicial interpreta-
tions of those norms stemming from different international or European 
and domestic legal orders and institutions, but that we should be more 
cautious before referring too quickly to that plurality as human rights 
pluralism of the kind the use of the term 'legal pluralism' is meant to 
indicate. Contrary to what many authors claim when conflating the two 
terms,7 the plurality of human rights does not necessarily imply their 
pluralism, 8 and the necessary normative arguments for the latter have 
not actually been provided in the literature, which tends to be empirical 
and largely descriptive.9 Furthermore, human rights norms are legitimat-
ing norms, and as a result their pluralism is bound to be very different 
from that of other legal norms. If there is a form of human rights plu-
ralism at work in Europe, I will argue that it is one of a very different 
kind: one that is about mutual legitimation, and that is situated at the 
core of the complex process of democratic legitimation of European legal 
orders. 
4 If one looks at the examples in Maduro, 'Three claims', note 2 above, or M. Kumm, 'The 
cosmopolitan turn in constitutionalism: on the relationship between constitutionalism in 
and beyond the state' in J. L. Dunoff and J. P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Inter-
national Law, Global Governance, Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), pp 258-326, human rights feature almost exclusively in their examples of 
legal pluralism. For Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above at 186 and 215, and Beyond 
Constitutionalism, note 2 above, by contrast, human rights pluralism is one kind of legal 
pluralism among many others. The same may be said paradoxically about the non-pluralist 
account of G. Letsas, 'Harmonic law - the case against pluralism and dialogue' in Dickson 
and Eleftheriadis, note 1 above, pp 77-108, who focuses on human rights in his argument 
against legal pluralism (although he does argue later on that human rights are different 
from other issues arising within ordinary EU law). 
5 See e.g. L. Azoulai, 'Conclusions' in E. Dubout and S. Touze (eds), Les droits fondamentaux: 
charnieres entres ordres et systemes juridiques (Paris: Pedone, 2010), pp 327-33. 
6 See e.g. Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above; the essays in Dubout and Touze, note 5 
above. 
7 See e.g. Maduro, 'Three claims', note 2 above; Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above; 
Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism, note 2 above. 
8 See e.g. Letsas, note 4 above. 
9 Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above at 198 fn. 92, 209ff., for instance, only provides 
empirical evidence of heterarchy and discusses strategic explanations for domestic and 
European courts' attitudes. 
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Context matters if we are to understand this topic, and a few words 
are therefore in order aboµt the circumstances in which the issues ·of 
European legal pluralism and human rights have come together. Lately, 
circumstances oflegal pluralism in the European Union (EU) have led to 
an increased focus on values, 10 on one hand, and on courts,11 on the other. 
Values have been identified, by legal scholars and practitioners equally, 
as constitutive of the common standards that democratic political and 
institutional structures and legal rules no longer provide in a context of 
competing legal orders, regimes and sources - or at least, provide only 
at the price of very high complexity. Unsurprisingly in those conditions, 
courts have become the privileged forum for decision making and have 
used values as guidance in complex normative conflicts. This conjunction 
of values and judicial power actually explains why human rights have 
become so central to the articulation of European legal orders and regimes 
in recent years. Increasingly, indeed, human rights are used as common 
standards for adjudicating normative conflicts in Europe, and hence as 
a solution to the normative consequences of legal pluralism. 12 The idea 
is indeed that all legitimate orders protect human rights and that their 
respective human rights norms provide common ground for judicial 
settlements in cases of normative conflict. 
Increasing references to human rights as the solution or part of the 
solution to legal pluralism in Europe do not come without difficulties, 
however. First, the multilevel and multisourced guarantees of human 
rights have been said to give rise to a legal pluralism of their own. This 
is the idea of human rights pluralism defended by many authors in the 
absence of a clear hierarchy between those guarantees. 13 Second, even if 
one disagrees with the possibility or idea of human rights pluralism, the 
plurality of courts and bodies interpreting human rights law in Europe has 
triggered jurisdictional conflicts over the correct interpretations of those 
rights. This kind of interpretative or judicial pluralism, and conflict over 
human rights interpretations, are an even more serious concern. Finally, 
a more careful and informed approach to the nature and legitimacy of the 
10 See A. Rosas, 'The European Court of Justice in context: forms and patterns of judicial 
dialogue', 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 2 (2007). 
11 See ibid., Maduro, 'Interpreting European law', note 2 above. 
12 See e.g. M. Maduro, 'La fonction juridictionnelle dans le contexte du pluralisme con-
stitutionnel: l'approche du droit communautaire' in Dubout and Touze, note 5 above; 
V. Champeil-Desplats, 'Les droits fondamentaux et l'identite des ordres juridiques: 
l' approche publiciste', in ibid., pp 149-64; and Azoulai, note 5 above. 
13 See e.g. Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above; Maduro, 'Three claims', note 2 above. 
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various human rights guarantees applying in Europe shows how the ref-
erence to human rights pluralism merely obfuscates the real stakes oflegal 
pluralism. It reveals a misunderstanding of both what European human 
rights are and what they are used for in European adjudication. Clarify-
ing why this is the case in this chapter is not only part of our collective 
endeavour to devise a new European legal theory, but should also con-
tribute to the nascent international law theory and international human 
rights theory in particular, as we may be able to learn from experiences 
gained within the European Union. 14 
My argument about European human rights pluralism will be four-
pronged. The first step will clarify what European legal pluralism really 
amounts to as it means different things to different people - and some-
times even to the same people. In section 2 of this chapter, I will turn 
to European human rights pluralism, and to its different understandings 
and roles in practice. The final section of the chapter will re-examine 
the question of European legal pluralism from a more political and, in 
particular, a more democratic approach. 
1. European legal pluralism 
Over the last twenty years or so, the concept oflegal pluralism has devel-
oped and consolidated in Europe. It emerged from the current circum-
stances of increasing density in European law, 15 and stems from the 
limitations of the monist/dualist divide when faced with the immedi-
ate validity of and/or lack of hierarchy among norms stemming from 
different legal orders, regimes and sources within the European Union.16 
14 See S. Besson, 'Human rights and democracy in a global context: decoupling and recou-
pling', 4 Ethics and Global Politics 1 (20ll), 19-50. 
15 I am consciously avoiding the term 'constitutional pluralism', as I am assuming that the 
autonomy of a legal order implies a rule of recognition and hence some kind of constitution 
in a material sense. As a result, legal pluralism in the sense it is understood in this chapter 
can only be constitutional pluralism (and see Letsas, note 4 above, indirectly). See also 
Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union 
and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 21, by reference 
to Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23. 
16 On those limitations, see the introduction in A. Nollkaemper and J. Nijman (eds), New 
Perspectives on the Divide between International Law and National Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). See e.g. the references in footnote 2. See also, more generally, 
Besson, 'European legal pluralism', note 2 above. 
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Needless to say, legal pluralism remains an ambiguous or 'fuzzy' 
concept. 17 Two dimensions of meaning at least need to be distinguished. 
In a first meaning, pluralism can be used to refer either to the normative 
consequences of the existence of a plurality or multiplicity oflegal norms, 
sources or regimes applicable within the same legal order (internal legal 
pluralism). This is what is usually meant by reference to pluralism within 
international law. 18 In a second meaning, and this is its niost common 
meaning and the one that is used in this chapter, it refers to a multiplicity 
of legal orders the norms contained in which can apply within a given 
legal order, usually the domestic one, albeit stemming from different legal 
orders (external legal pluralism). Of course, both types oflegal pluralism 
can overlap and usually external legal pluralism is also characterised by 
some form of internal legal pluralism.19 
In practice, and this is what distinguishes a situation oflegal pluralism 
from the legal situation that used to prevail, those plural legal norms coin-
cide in the same social sphere and overlap on the same issues, people and 
territory, thus sharing the same material, personal and territorial scope. 20 
As a result, legal pluralism is usually experienced within a domestic legal 
order where norrris stemming from the European and international legal 
orders meet and interact upon direct application to their subjects. In 
this respect, it is important to distinguish between legal pluralism in an 
17 
'Fuzzy': Letsas, note 4 above. I am not looking here at moral pluralism or social and cultural 
pluralism, but only at legal pluralism. Of course, legal pluralism can be a consequence of 
moral, social or cultural pluralism, but is not necessarily so. Moreover, I am not looking 
at non-official forms oflaw and social norms and hence am not considering those forms 
of pluralism of social norms: see e.g. S. Moore Falk, Law as Process: An Anthropological 
Approach (London: Routledge, 1978); B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: 
Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition (London: Routledge, 1995). See 
also K. Giinther, 'Rechtspluralismus und universaler Code der Legalitat: Globalisierung 
als rechtstheoretisches Problem' in L. Wingert and K. Giinther (eds), Die Offentlichkeit 
der Vernunft und die Vernunft der Offentlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001), pp 539-67; 
J. Griffiths, 'What is legal pluralism?', 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism (1986), 2-55; W. 
Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000). 
18 See e.g. International Law Commission, 'Fragmentation of international law: difficulties 
arising from the diversification and expansion of international law', Final Report, 13 April 
2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682. See also S. Besson, 'Whose constitution(s)? international 
law, constitutionalism and democracy' in Dunoff and Trachtman, note 4 above, pp 381-
407; S. Besson, 'Theorizing the sources of international law' in Besson and Tasioulas, note 
1 above, pp 163-85. 
19 This is also why external legal pluralism is the more complete of the two and entails both 
the validity-related and authority-related dimensions discussed below. 
20 See e.g. Griffiths, note 17 above at 8; Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory, note 17 
above,p. 8. 
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integrated legal order such as that made up of the EU and domestic legal 
orders, on one hand, and legal pluralism in other legal orders, on the 
other. An example of the latter is the legal pluralism that prevails in any 
domestic order to which different international law regimes apply at the 
same time, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and UN law in the domestic legal order. Importantly, however, a more 
advanced form oflegal pluralism is very characteristic of the former inte-
grated legal orders. An integrated legal order is indeed an autonomous 
legal order made up of many autonomous legal orders that do not lose 
their autonomy as a result.21 The identification of the particular legal 
order within which legal pluralism is experienced is important not only 
in determining the norm-applying actors in charge of validating legal 
norms stemming from different legal orders and hence of settling their 
potentially conflicting claims to (exclusionary) legitimate authority. It 
also matters if one is to avoid the slippery transitions, that are common 
in the legal pluralism literature, from a discussion of plural legal 'norms' 
to considerations of a 'pluralist legal order'. 22 
Two further meanings of the concept of external legal pluralism may be 
identified: first of all, pluralism qua validity and pluralism qua rank, and, 
second, within either of them, pluralism of norms/sources/regimes and 
pluralism of orders (or more exactly of norms stemming from different 
orders) applying to the same subjects. 
When pluralism is used to refer to a plurality oflegal orders overlapping 
within the same social sphere, this is usually meant to distinguish plural-
ism from monism.23 As such, it constitutes an elaborate and interlocking 
version of dualism. Legal validity does not, however, depend on transpo-
sition or reception in different legal orders contrary to what is the case in 
a dualist legal order. What matters is that the validity of those different 
21 On the notion of integrated legal order, see Besson, 'How international', note 1 above 
and 'European legal pluralism', note 2 above. On the place of international law within the 
EU's integrated legal order, see ibid., and both the judgment and the Opinion of Advocate 
General Kokott in Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America, nyr. 
22 See e.g. Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above at 185-6 on human rights pluralism 
qua pluralistic legal 'order'; he moves swiftly from 'human rights law' (domestic and 
international) to the opposition between 'different', 'integrated' and 'pluralistic' 'legal 
orders'. I do not plan, however, to explain how to distinguish between legal pluralism 
within a particular legal order, usually the domestic one, and a pluralistic legal order, but 
merely to draw attention to the importance of the distinction. 
23 Note that monism is a theory of legal validity within a given legal order, and not of legal 
autonomy. As a result legal monism is entirely compatible with the coexistence of separate, 
autonomous, legal orders, provided they do not overlap entirely. 
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norms can be established together and at the same time in their respective 
legal orders, and this is best captured by the concept of plurivalidity.24 
Pluralism in this first meaning of the concept pertains therefore to the 
validity of legal norms. It assumes that legal norms' validity can have 
many autonomous sources within the same territory or political com-
munity and within the same legal order. More specifically, this may be 
explained, in legal positivist terms, by reference to the plurality of rules 
of recognition coexisting within the same legal order and identifying the 
criteria for validity of the legal norms to be applied in each case by the 
norm-applying institutions. 25 
The term 'legal pluralism' can also be used, however, having the mean-
ing equivalence of legal norms or of legal sources, either within a legal 
order or between different legal orders. In that sense, pluralism is opposed 
to hierarchy. It provides a different answer to the question of first primacy 
and then rank among legal norms from the same legal order or from 
different legal orders that overlap in a given legal order. Of course, the 
plurality of valid and equally strong legal norms need not necessarily lead 
to normative conflict, but it might do so and this is how it usually attracts 
attention. In a case of normative conflict, pluralism is usually contrasted 
with the existence of a formal hierarchy of sources or of norms, and 
equated with heterarchy as a result; the legal order at stake entails no rules 
of conflict and the settlement of potential normative conflicts has to be 
left to judicial politics. More specifically, the equivalence in rank of legal 
norms within a pluralist legal order may be explained, in legal positivist 
terms, by reference to the coexistence of various rules of recognition with 
distinct validity criteria, on one hand, and to the absence of ranking rules 
in all legal orders, on the other.26 
Those distinctions are important. First, not all those forms of legal 
pluralism present the same difficulty for legal theory. It is one thing for 
the law-applying institutions in a legal order to recognise the legal norms 
of another legal order as valid and hence as authoritative norms in their 
legal order, and another to discuss which ones should take priority in 
cases of conflict. Nor, secondly, need the remedies be the same in all cases. 
Thus, the principle of normative coherence can be regarded as a remedy 
for the absence of hierarchy or rules of conflict between norms in the same 
24 See Besson, 'How international', note 1 above, p. 14; Gunther, note 17 above. 
25 See J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 35ff.; Barber, 
note 2 above. 
26 See Raz, ibid., p. 35ff.; Barber, ibid., at 322. 
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legal order. It is not so relevant, however, when the question pertains to 
the validity of one legal order's norms in another legal order. Of course, in 
general, often pluralism qua validity only really matters when questions of 
conflict between norms and hence issues of rank arise; normative conflicts 
are really of interest only if the legal norms at stake are concurrently valid 
legal norms. And this is what makes the distinction so difficult to draw in 
practice. 
From a meta-theoretical perspective, legal pluralism is often used as a 
descriptive concept and hence presumably in order to qualify an empir-
ical fact.27 It is important, however, to distinguish the mere plurality of 
legal norms from legal pluralism. 28 Legal pluralism implies some kind 
of normative statement about how the legal validity and legal authority 
of that plurality of norms ought to be organised. Those cannot merely 
be described. True, practices around them or even the legal actors' cost-
benefit calculus and attitudes may be,29 but not the legal norms' validity 
and authority themselves. Regrettably, no normative argument for legal 
pluralism is to be found in that scholarship, except for a few contributions 
that are usually sceptical about its existence. 30 
Of course, this normative onus on theories oflegal pluralism raises the 
broader issue of whether legal theory can ever be purely descriptive. My 
answer is that it cannot. Legal positivism, which is the kind oflegal theory 
endorsed here, is itself normative qua legal theory. And legal pluralism, 
as part of legal positivism,31 needs to be argued for normatively. It is 
important, therefore, to provide a normative defence of legal pluralism 
within the realm oflegal positivism. The argument is that legal pluralism 
may be justified by reference to democratic legitimacy and, more specifi-
cally, to the multilevel democratic legitimation of different legal sources, 
27 See e.g. Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above, and Beyond Constitutionalism, note 2 
above. 
28 The same distinction may be drawn between 'ethical plurality' and 'ethical pluralism'. 
29 This is what Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above at 209ff. does, for instance, by 
reference to political science literature in the field of international adjudication. · 
30 See e.g. Besson, 'European legal pluralism', note 2 above; A. Somek, 'The concept of 
"law" in global administrative law: a reply to Benedict Kingsbury', 20 European Journal 
of International Law 4 (2009), 985-95; Letsas, note 4 above. See, however, most recently 
Maduro, 'Three claims', note 2 above; Davies, note 2 above. 
31 I agree with Letsas, note 4 above, and A. Zysset, 'Epistemological analysis of the "disor-
der" of European legal pluralism' in S. Besson and N. Levrat (eds), Des-ordres Juridiques 
Europeens - European Legal Dis-Orders (Zurich: Schulthess, 2012), on the legal positivist 
underpinnings of the notion of legal pluralism. However, I disagree with them about the 
fatality of the empirical nature of the legal positivist argument for legal pluralism. 
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regimes and orders by reference to the same democratic people.32 This 
normative, democracy-based argument for legal pluralism also explains 
the judicial recourse to further principles in the resolution of normative 
conflicts, such as subsidiarity, for instance. As I will argue in the human 
rights context, judicial dialogue on its own cannot explain what judges 
are doing when settling those cases. Nor may it account on its own for the 
kind of normative cooperation and mutual reasoning they embrace. 
Last but not least, it is important to distinguish the legal pluralism 
discussed in this section from judicial pluralism, i.e. the plurality of and 
lack of hierarchy between courts belonging to different legal orders albeit 
interpreting and applying the same legal norms in each of those legal 
orders. The two forms of pluralism are distinct, albeit often joint in 
practice. It is important to keep them apart, however. There may be 
many courts with jurisdiction over the application and interpretation of 
the same legal norms in the same political community, as exemplified 
by the adjudication over the ECHR in the EU by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and domestic courts. Conversely, the same court may be called 
on to apply a plurality of legal norms stemming from different legal 
orders as exemplified by domestic courts applying EU law. Of course, in 
most cases, judicial pluralism enhances legal pluralism by multiplying the 
interpretations of the same norms that stem from different legal orders 
within the same legal order. Moreover, judicial pluralism is largely a 
consequence oflegal pluralism, given that normative conflicts need to be 
settled somehow and usually through judicial intervention. And in cases 
where those settlements are in the hands of many courts, legal pluralism 
is more or less regulated by judicial pluralism. In this chapter, however, I 
shall focus on legal pluralism as distinct from judicial pluralism so as to 
untie, as much as possible, the role of human rights in the articulation 
of legal orders from what courts hold of that role and from the function 
they play in that context.33 
32 See Besson, 'European legal pluralism', note 2 above, drawing a distinction in this respect 
between EU law and international law. 
33 Most discussions ofhuman rights pluralism in Europe usually treat both issues together. See 
e.g. L. Scheeck, 'The relationship between the European Courts and integration through 
human rights', 65 Zeitschrift for Ausli:indisches Offentliches Recht und ViJlkerrecht (2005), 
83 7-85; S. Douglas-Scott, 'A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing 
European human rights acquis', Common Market Law Review 43 (2006), 629-66; Rosas, 
note 10 above; G. Harpaz, 'The ECJ and its relations with the ECtHR', Common Mar-
ket Law Review 46 (2009), 105-42; J. Callewaert, 'The European Convention on Human 
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Interestingly, one of the most severe challenges to legal pluralism stems 
precisely from its proponents' emphasis on judges and judicial politics in 
cases of normative conflicts. Letsas argues, for instance, that this emphasis 
implies that the non-legal and political role of judges becomes so impor-
tant that it is untenable for legal positivists, who can only accommodate 
judicial discretion within certain limited boundaries.34 This argument 
fails to convince, however. It is not only indeterminate in terms of thresh-
old but, given that legal pluralism does not necessarily lead to normative 
conflicts, it lacks teeth. Legal pluralism is no less tenable for courts because 
it is no longer only internal but also external, to refer to the distinction I 
made before. Of course, Letsas is right to argue against judicial dialogue 
as the solution to legal pluralism, however. As I will argue, handling legal 
pluralism requires much more than dialogue. As a result, not all legal 
pluralist theories need to endorse judicial dialogue, and the objections to 
judicial dialogue need not be regarded as objections to legal pluralism. 
2. European human rights pluralism 
When transposed into the European human rights context, the issue of 
legal pluralism raises two distinct sets of questions: the issue of human 
rights pluralism itself and that of the role of human rights in the context 
oflegal pluralism. Both need to be addressed in turn, as they raise separate 
difficulties and have too often been conflated, with the result that both are 
either endorsed or rejected at the same time, and usually for the wrong 
reasons. 
2.1. Human rights pluralism in Europe 
Interestingly, European human rights law is often invoked as a primary 
example of legal pluralism in Europe. 35 The human rights applicable to 
any given situation within a European state stem from many different legal 
Rights and European Union law: a long way to harmony', European Human Rights Law 
Review6 (2009), 768-83; Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism, note 2 above. See on the legit-
imacy of supranational human rights review in Europe, e.g. S. Besson, 'European human 
rights, supranational judicial review and democracy- thinking outside the judicial box' in 
P. Popelier, C. van Nuffel and P. van den Heyning (eds), Human Rights Protection in 
the European Legal Order: The Interaction between the European and the National Courts 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 20ll), pp 97-145. 
34 Letsas, note 4 above. 
35 See e.g. Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above; Maduro, 'Three claims', note 2 above. 
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orders, or at least from different sources and regimes within the same legal 
order: e.g. domestic human rights, EU fundamental rights and ECHR 
rights. Because those various sources of human rights interact in ways 
that allegedly can no longer be explained solely by reference to monism 
or dualism, 36 and, more precisely, because ECHR rights in particular are 
mostly immediately valid as domestic human rights within the domes-
tic legal order, pluralism is usually regarded as the best explanation of 
their relationship, on one hand. 37 On the other, the relationship between 
domestic human rights, ECHR rights and EU fundamental rights, when 
interpreted by their respective adjudication bodies, is said to be unclear 
and conflicting claims to authority are said to be made in many cases. As 
a result, that relationship is usually approached as a pluralist one in the 
absence of a clear hierarchy between those rights. 38 
In line with the argument I made earlier about European legal plural-
ism, the key question, however, is whether, besides the empirical evidence 
given for those two dimensions of European human rights plurality, one 
may bring forward normative arguments for the existence of European 
human rights pluralism proper. As I argued earlier, indeed, legal valid-
ity and legal authority ca.nnot merely be described as empirical facts, 
and the normative underpinnings of those descriptive statements need 
to be argued for. The plurality of human rights norms internationally 
and domestically, and of interpretations of human rights by international 
and domestic judicial bodies, need not yet imply a form of human rights 
pluralism. 
I will make two sets of points here: one pertaining to the pluralism of 
human rights themselves and the other to the pluralism of human rights' 
interpretations. Within each, I will focus both on the plural validity and 
the plural authority of human rights norms. Of course, as I have explained 
and will explain again in relation to human rights, the distinction between 
human rights norms and their judicial interpretations and applications 
is artificial. All the same, it is important to draw that distinction between 
human rights norms and their judicial interpretations in order to stress the 
difference between plural validity and plural rank, and, more significantly, 
in order to dispel the idea, which I will address later in the chapter, that 
their abstract normative equivalence might be invoked to settle other 
normative conflicts without requiring a judicial interpretation of the 
36 See e.g. H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on 
National Legal Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
37 See e.g. Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above at 184-5. 38 Ibid. 
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human rights themselves and without having to consider the potential 
conflicts between distinct international or European and domestic judicial 
interpretations. 
2.2. Pluralism of human rights law in Europe 
By reference to what I said about legal pluralism in the previous sec-
tion, the argument that would need to be made in favour of human 
rights pluralism would be, first, that European human rights norms 
are immediately valid on the domestic level regardless of whether the 
domestic legal order is monist or dualist and, second, that there are no 
hierarchies when European norms conflict with domestic human rights 
norms. 
While both points appear to be arguable at first sight, they underesti-
mate a crucial feature of international or European and domestic human 
rights norms: their mutuality, both in terms of validity and in terms 
of legitimate authority. Thus, while human rights law may indeed be 
regarded as pluralist, this, on its own, does not capture the core of the 
relationship at work between international or European human rights 
law and domestic human rights law. Since I have already developed an 
argument for the mutual validation and legitimation of domestic and 
international or regional human rights law elsewhere, 39 I will focus here 
on how that mutual validation and legitimation may be understood as a 
special instantiation of legal pluralism. Note that, as I explained earlier 
in relation to legal pluralism in general, the distinction between validity 
and legitimacy is merely conceptual given how closely related they are 
in practice, and the mutual validity of international or European human 
rights and domestic human rights has to be explained by reference to 
their mutual legitimation. 
First of all, then, let us look at the plurivalidity of human rights law. A 
pluralist argument would read along the lines that international or Euro-
pean and domestic human rights legal norms draw their joint validity 
from separate rules of recognition within the domestic legal order. Actu-
ally, however, it would be more accurate to argue that their plurivalidity 
amounts to intervalidity or mutual validity to the extent that their validity 
is mutually determined. 
39 See S. Besson, 'Human rights and constitutional law' in R. Cruft, ,S. M. Liao and N. Renzo 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
forthcoming. 
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To start with, it is important to stress the existence of a so-called 'dual 
positivisation' of human rights in international or European law and 
domestic law.40 Authors still disagree about the grounds for that dual 
positivisation and juxtaposition of human rights regim:s in the dome~tic 
legal order. Those are neither chronological, substantive nor remedial. 
International and domestic human rights norms as we know them today 
date back roughly to the same post-1945 era, a time at w~ich or. a~er 
which the international bill of rights was drafted on the basis of existmg 
domestic bills of rights and at which or after which most existing domest~c 
constitutions were either completely revised or drafted anew on the basis 
of the international bill of rights.4i Nowadays, in actual fact, c.onstitu-
tional rights either antedate the adoption of international. hum.an rights 
law or ought to be adopted on the ground of the latter - either m prepa-
ration for ratification or as a consequence thereof 42 - thus confirming 
the synchronic nature of their functions and the requirement that they 
coexist; one no longer goes without the other.43 Interestingly, however, 
the content and the structure of the human rights protected are, by and 
large, the same.44 Neither, finally, does the key to the relationship between 
domestic and international human rights lie in their enforcement, as both 
human rights regimes are owned by domestic institutions, implemented 
by domestic institutions and monitored in the same way.45 • 
What is clear, however, is that the two regimes are not merely Juxta-
posed- with international human rights law qua gap-filling rights46 - and 
hence should not be regarded as redundant regimes at best. The difference 
between the two legal regimes of human rights and the underlying ground 
for their dual positivisation and validation in the domestic legal order, as a 
result, pertains to their distinct albeit complementary f_u~ctions.47 In~er­
national human rights law secures the external and mmimal prote~t10n 
of the right to have domestic human rights in the political commumty of 
40 See G. Neuman, 'Human rights and constitutional rights', 55 Stanford Law Review 5 (2003), 
1863-1900 at 1864. 
41 s. Gardbaum, 'Human rights as international constitutional rights', 19 European Journal 
of International Law4 (2008), 749-68 at 750. . . 
42 See e.g. Art. 1 ECHR; Arts. 2 and 4 Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
43 See also Gardbaum, note 41 above at 764ff. 44 Ibid., at 750-51. 
45 See also R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2011~, PP 33~-4. 
See also K. Hessler, 'Resolving interpretive conflicts in international human nghts law, 13 
Journal of Political Philosophy 1 (2005), 29-52 at 37. 
46 See Gardbaum, note 41 above at 764. 47 See also Dworkin, note 45 above, PP 334-5. 
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which one is a member. That externalised human rights regime works on 
three levels domestically and has three functions accordingly: 
1. a substantive one: it requires the protection of the minimal and abstract 
content of those rights against domestic levelling-down, and works 
therefore as a form ofback-up;48 
2. a personal one: it requires the inclusion of all those subjected to domes-
tic jurisdiction,49 territorially and extraterritorially and whether they 
are nationals or not, in the scope of those rights; so and 
3. a procedural one: it requires the introduction of both internal and exter-
nal institutional mechanisms to monitor and enforce those rights.s1 
Both levels of protection are usually regarded as complementary and as 
serving different functions, therefore, rather than as providing competing 
guarantees. This complementary relationship between international and 
domestic guarantees explains why the reception of international human 
rights into domestic law is favoured or even required· by international 
human rights instruments. Domestic human rights law does more than 
merely implement international human rights, therefore: it contextualises 
and specifies them. This explains why international human rights are 
usually drafted in minimal and abstract terms, thus calling for domestic 
reception and specification. s2 They rely on national guarantees to formu-
late a minimal threshold that they reflect and entrench internationally. 
That entrenchment is dynamic and the minimal content of international 
human rights may evolve with time. s3 More importantly, they are usually 
abstract and meant to be fleshed out at the domestic level, not only in 
terms of the specific duties attached to a given right but also in terms of 
the right itself. 
48 See A. Buchanan, 'Reciprocal legitimation: reframing the problem of international legit-
imacy', 10 Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (2011), 5-19 at 11; Gardbaum, note 41 
above at 764. 
49 See S. Besson, 'The extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: why 
human rights require jurisdiction and what jurisdiction amounts to', 25 Leiden Journal of 
International Law4 (2012), 857-84. 
so See Buchanan, note 48 above at 12-13; Gardbaum, note 41 above at 765-7. 
51 I do not agree with the other functions of international human rights law suggested by 
Gardbaum, note 41 above at 766-8 and Buchanan, note 48 above at 11-14. 
52 See Besson, 'Decoupling and recoupling', note 14 above; Dworkin, note 45 above, pp 
337-8. 
53 See S. Besson, 'The erga omnes effect of ECtHR's judgments - what's in a name?', in 
Besson (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14 - First Assessment and 
Perspectives (Zurich: Schulthess, 2011), pp 125-75, on the interpretative authority of the 
ECtHR's judgments. 
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As a matter of fact, it is through the relationship of mutual reinforce-
ment between domestic human rights and international human rights, 
and the productive tension between external guarantees and internal ones, 
that human rights law has consolidated at both domestic and international 
levels. s4 International human rights law places duties on domestic author-
ities to include them within domestic human rights law and to implement 
them in a democratic fashion, and the latter feed into international human 
rights guarantees in return. This constant interaction between interna-
tional and domestic human rights is reminiscent of Arendt's universal 
right to have particular rights and the to-ing and fro-ing between the 
universal and the particular. International human rights are specified as 
domestic human rights, but domestic human rights progressively consol-
idate into international human rights in return. 
This virtuous circle can actually be exemplified by reference to the 
sources of international human rights law. International human rights 
law is indeed deemed to belong to general international law and finds 
its sources both in general principles of international law, and arguably 
also in customary international law. Both sets of sources derive inter-
national norms from domestic ones and this jurisgenerative process is 
actually epitomised by the sources of international human rights law.ss 
Historically, much of the content of international human rights treaties 
was actually drawn from domestic bills of rights, and many of the latter 
were then revised after 1945 to come into line with the former.s6 The 
mutual relationship between international and domestic human rights 
can also be confirmed by recent human rights practice, whether it is of a 
customary, conventional or even judicial nature. Domestic human rights 
contribute to the development of the corresponding international human 
rights' judicial or quasi-judicial interpretations. This is clearly the case in 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights where common 
54 See Besson, 'Decoupling and recoupling', note 14 above; J. Habermas, 'The concept of 
human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights', 41 Metaphilosophy 4 (2010), 
465-80 at 478; S. Benhabib, 'Claiming rights across borders: international human rights 
and democratic sovereignty', 103 American Political Science Review 4 (2009), 691-704; 
S. Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2011), pp 16 and 126; J. Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Bin Essay (Berlin: 
Suhrkamp, 2011), pp 31-2, 36-8. 
55 See S. Besson, 'General principles in international law- whose principles?' in S. Besson and 
P. Pichonnaz (eds), Les principes en droit europeen - Principles in European Law (Zurich: 
Schulthess, 2011), pp 21-68. 
56 See J. Morsink, Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots of the Universal Declaration 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 149. 
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ground is a constant concern and is sought after when interpreting the 
ECHR.57 
That mutual relationship between international and domestic human 
rights law may also be observed from the way in which international 
human rights norms are validated in the domestic legal order. 58 Unlike 
other international law norms, international human rights law claims, 
and is usually granted, immediate validity and direct effect in domestic 
legal orders.59 This occurs in many cases through the joint and largely 
indistinct application of international and constitutional human rights by 
domestic authorities, and in particular domestic courts. There is, in other 
words, no difference between international human rights and domestic 
constitutional rights in terms of validity within the domestic legal order. 
Nor are they differentiated in most cases, as they are usually subsumed 
within a composite set of human rights norms. Once validated through 
this kind of indiscriminate application, what matters is the human right, 
and no longer its legal source. 
Second, we must examine the heterarchy of human rights law. The 
second feature oflegal pluralism may also be verified in the human rights 
context, which does not assign to international or European human rights 
law priority over domestic human rights law and vice versa. As a matter 
of fact, not only does neither take priority over the other, as in other cases 
of legal pluralism, but they should be seen, moreover, as standing in a 
relationship of mutual legitimation that is usually lacking in those other 
cases. 
Importantly, indeed, the legal enforcement of international human 
rights is a two-way street that is not limited to a top-down reception 
of international law in domestic law, but also spreads from the bottom 
u~:-vards and ~omes closer to a virtuous circle oflegitimation. The recog-
mt10n and existence of those rights qua international human rights that 
constrain domestic politics ought indeed to be based on democratic prac-
tices recognised on a domestic level. Their content reflects the outcome of 
democratic interpretations of human rights. And only those polities that 
both respect international human rights and are democratic are deemed 
57 See Besson, 'Erga omnes effect', note 53 above. 
58 See Neuman, note 40 above at 1890-95. 
59 
This is p~rticul~rly stri!<l?g in leg~ orders within which international law is not necessarily 
?ranted n~med~ate val1d1ty and d1rect effect. See e.g. S. Besson, 'The reception of the ECHR 
m the Umted Kingdom and Ireland' in Keller and Stone Sweet, note 36 above, pp 31-106; 
and H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet, 'Introduction: the reception of the ECHR in national 
legal orders' in ibid., pp 3-30. 
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legitimate in specifying the content of those rights further, and h.ence 
in contributing to the further recognition and existence of those nghts 
qua international human rights that will constrain them in return. 60 T?~s 
dynamic phenomenon is what Buchanan refers to as the mutual legiti-
mation of domestic and international law. 61 
Of course, the mutual legitimation of international or European human 
rights law and domestic human rights law does not mean that normative 
conflicts cannot arise. This is the so-called 'divergence question', and 
it is usually described as a conflict of incompatible claims to legitimate 
authority stemming from domestic and international human rights law.~2 
Interestingly, the question is often misunderstood. One of the mam 
difficulties with this understanding of the question and of the discourse 
pertaining to human rights pluralism in Europe is actually the tendency 
to conflate the plurality of judicial interpretations of the same human 
rights norms among European and domestic institutions, a serious issue 
in itself, with the plurality of human rights norms just discussed. Not 
only does the latter not imply the former, but their respective p~uralisms 
need to be carefully distinguished from one another, as I explamed ear-
lier in relationship to the general distinction between legal and judicial 
pluralism. 
Human rights themselves cannot enter into conflict as they share the 
same abstract content (i.e. protection of the same interests against the 
same standard threats) independently of their international or domestic 
sources. Instead, it is the interpretations of human rights and the speci-
fications of the corresponding duties in concrete local circumstances by 
international and domestic institutions that may conflict with each other. 
And this is the case a fortiori, whether the human rights interpreted and 
specified by those institutions are the same interna~ional hum~n rights, 
on one hand, or distinct international and domesttc human nghts, on 
the other. In other words, where two human rights norms stem from 
different legal sources, therefore, what may differ between them are not 
the abstract rights but the concrete duties and this can only be the case 
once the norms have been applied to the same set of circumstances by 
different authorities. Furthermore, as discussed above, in the reception 
60 See Hessler, note 45 above at 48ff. 
61 See A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for Inter-
national Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp 187-9; Buchanan, 'Reciprocal 
legitimation', note 48 above. 
62 Neuman, note 40 above at 1873-4 and 1874ff. for the various divergences. 
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~rocess international human rights are usually subsumed within domes-
tic hu1?1an rights no~ms, an? in particular within constitutional rights, 
an~ ~his turns them mto valid domestic law; it not only grants them the leg1ti~acy of domestic law, but also takes care, usually, of any potential 
conflict of authority as a result. 
. All this explains why the idea of human rights pluralism qua human 
~1g~ts h.eter~rchy is ~isleading:63 t~ere may be a plurality of human rights 
mstitutions mt~rpretmg the same mternational human rights norms dif-
ferently'. but this does not entail a conflict between the international or 
domestic le~al norm~ protecting those rights. 64 Of course, human rights 
ma~ co~e. mto .conflict when their corresponding duties conflict, 65 but 
agai? this Is .an mdependent question that has nothing to do with either 
the mternati~nal or ~omestic sources of the rights themselves, on one ha~d, or the mternational or domestic nature of the interpreting insti-
t~tions, on the other. 66 Finally, international human rights may conflict 
with norms of domestic constitutional law other than human rights when 
the abstract content of the latter is clear, but this is another matter: 
. Once. reformulated, the question is then how one should handle con-
~Icts of mte~pret~tio~ or specification between international and domes-
~Ic h~~an nght~ ms~1tuti~ns. 67 This means identifying which institution 
IS leg1t1~ate or Justified m its claim to final authority over the issue. 68 
Internat10nal human rights institutions may be tribunals, like the Euro-
pea~ or !nter-American Cou:t of Human Rights, or independent treaty ~od~es, .like the UN human n~~ts t~eat! bodies. Domestic human rights 
mstitut10n~ co;~r any ~omestic mst1tut10ns implementing human rights, 
but mos~y !u~1c~al bodies whether they specialise in human rights or have 
general J~nsdICtion. And this issue actually constitutes the object of the 
next section. 
:: See e.g. Kris~h, Beyon~ Constitutionalism, note 2 above. 
65 See Besson, Human nghts and constitutional law', note 39 above. 
See e.g .. J. Waldron,. 'Rights in conflict' in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991 (Cam.bn~ge: C~mbndge University Press, 1993), pp 203-24; s. Besson, 'Conflicts of 
c~n~titut1onal ngh.ts: nature, typology and resolution' in Besson, The Morali of Con-
flict. Reasonabl~ Di~agree~ent and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), p; 419-56; ts~uc(Nca, Consti~utional Dile.mm~s: Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights in Europe and the 
66 ew York. Oxford Umvers1ty Press, 2007). 
Contra: s.ee e.g. ".· ~orr~s Perez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theor of 
67 Supranational Ad;udication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). y See e.g. Hessler, note 45 above at 32-3. 
68 r~ S. Besson, '~~e legitimate auth?rity of international human rights' in A. F0Ilesdal et al. 
e .s), ~he Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes (Cambridge· Cambr'd 
Umvers1ty Press, 2013). · 1 ge 
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2.3. Pluralism of human rights interpretations in Europe 
The next question then is whether the plurality of human rights interpre-
tations that stem from different competent judicial bodies in Europe may 
be equated with a form oflegal pluralism. This is not so much a question 
of validity, but rather one of rank or hierarchy in response to poten-
tial conflicts between those plural interpretations. Allegedly, indeed, the 
relationship between European interpretations of human rights by their 
respective adjudication bodies is unclear, and conflicting claims to author-
ity are made in many cases. In the absence of a clear hierarchy between 
them, that relationship is usually approached as a pluralist one. 69 
Here again, my argument will be that, while it is true that there is no 
hierarchy of human rights interpretations in Europe, their relationship is 
more complex than mere heterarchy: it is one of mutuality. Their different 
roles or functions preclude the possibility of a real conflict as a result. 
To start with, there are various arguments one might artieulate for the 
priority of domestic human rights institutions in the interpretation and 
specification of human rights. 70 I will restrict myself to two here: one is 
democratic and the other practical. First of all, domestic human rights 
institutions are the institutions of the democratic polity to which belong 
the members whose rights are affected and to which those members' 
duties need to be allocated. The egalitarian dimension of human rights ties 
them closely to political and more specifically to democratic procedures 
in the specification and allocation of duties. Only domestic institutions 
present those democratic and egalitarian qualities in relation to the human 
rights that bind them and which they ought to protect. Second, domestic 
institutions have the institutional capacity to allocate the burden of duties 
fairly in view of the resources available and in knowledge of the concrete 
threats to the protected interests. The concrete dimension of human 
rights duties makes their identification and distribution a necessarily 
local matter and the same applies to the resolution of conflicts of human 
rights duties or to the justification of required restrictions to human 
rights duties. Domestic institutions are clearly better situated to ensure 
69 See e.g. Krisch, 'Open architecture', note 3 above at 184--5. 
70 See Hessler, note 45 above at 42ff. On the legitimacy of international judicial review of 
human rights, see also Besson, 'Supranational judicial review', note 33 above; A. F0Ilesdal, 
'International judicial human rights review - effective, legitimate or both?' in J. Sihvola, 
P. Korkman and V. Makinen (eds), Universalism in International Law and Political Phi-
losophy (Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2008); A. von Staden, 'The 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review beyond the state: normative subsidiarity and judi-
cial standards of review', 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (2012), 1023--49. 
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that allocation and hence the interpretation of human rights duties in 
context. 
Importantly, however, despite being situated outside the democratic 
polity to which belong those members whose human rights and duties 
are. conce~ned, the.parallel existence of international human rights insti-
tut10ns. with a claim to final and legitimate authority does not mean 
tha~ this ~hould. be understood as a juxtaposed and competing moni-
toring regime, situated in a heterarchical relationship to domestic ones. 
As a result, assigning priority to either domestic or international human 
rights int~rpretations should not be understood as implying a hierar-
chy or ~ h1g~er legit~mate authority in any way. The claims to legitimate 
authority of international and domestic human rights institutions are not 
in competition and potential conflict with one another. 71 Their mutual-
ity dates back to the post-1945 human rights regime and needs to be 
ful~y. grasped at ~ast. T)lis implies understanding that their claims to 
legitimate authority are not distinctly justified on different bases and in 
an exclus~v~ fas.hion: bui
2 
on the. c?ntra:y share. a mutually reinforcing, 
democratic JUstificat10n. Thus, it is the international human rights insti-
tutions' potent~al contribution to democratic processes or compensation 
~or any do~estic .lack thereof that helps justify their legitimate authority 
in the cases in which they impose particular human rights interpretations 
on domes~ic autho:ities. 73 Just as international human rights contribute 
t~ pro~ecting the rights to democratic membership and to have human 
rights in a de~o~rat~c p~lity, international human rights institutions pro- . t~ct democratic institut10ns and guarantee their ability to respect human 
rights. 
Thus, just as international and domestic human rights law comple-
me~t each other and are in productive tension, their interpreting insti-
tut10~s should ~e understood as situated in a joint, albeit complemen-
tary, in~~rpretat~ve. endeavour and not as mutually exclusive interpretative 
authorities. This is confirmed by the fact that institutional and pro-
c~dural standards for the implementation and monitoring of human 
rights ar~ de~eloped internally in cooperation among democratic states, 
trans~at10nahsed and then internationalised from the bottom up and 
then imposed from the top down again as external constraints on domes-
tic institutions and procedures. International institutions and procedures 
71 See e.g. Neuman, note 40 above at 1873-4. 
;; See Buchanan, 'Reciprocal legitimation', note 48 above. 
Ibid. See also Hessler, note 45 above at 45ff. 
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are incomplete without domestic ones, but the latter are organised so as 
to work in tension with the former. One may think, for instance, of the 
development of conventional review in European democracies that did 
not know of constitutional review before ratifying the ECHR. Conversely, 
one should mention the 2009 introduction within the ECHR regime of 
an infringement procedure, based on domestic authorities' experiences 
with the implementation of their own human rights decisions. 
This normative account of the mutual interpretative authority of 
domestic and international human rights institutions fits current human 
rights practice and the ways in which potential interpretative conflicts 
are handled,74 and in particular the principle of subsidiarity that char-
acterises that practice.75 International human rights institutions only 
intervene once domestic remedies have been exhausted and domestic 
authorities have had a chance to specify, allocate and interpret human 
rights duties in context. One may refer to this as procedural or jurisdic-
tional subsidiarity. Further, they are usually very reluctant to question 
domestic institutions' interpretations and specifications of human rights 
in the specific political context. This may be described as material or 
substantive subsidiarity. International human rights institutions respect 
domestic institutions' 'margin of appreciation' in most cases.76 Finally, 
they usually impose obligations to reach a result through judgment or 
decision, but leave the choice of means to domestic authorities. This is 
referred to as remedial subsidiarity. 
The only limit on that international institutional subsidiarity, however, 
is the existence of a consensus among most democratic states going in a 
74 See Neuman, note 40 above at 1880ff. 
75 See Besson, 'Erga omnes effect', note 53 above. See also D. Shelton, 'Sub~idiario/ ~nd 
human rights law', 27 Human Rights Law Journal 1 (2006), 4-11; L. Helfer, Re~es~gnmg 
the European Court of Human Rights: embeddedness as a deep struc_tural prmc1ple of 
the European human rights regime', 19 European Journal of International Law (2008), 
125-59. 
76 See C. van de Heyning, 'No place like home: discretionary space for the domestic protection 
of fundamental rights' in Popelier, van Nuffel and van de Heyning, note 33 above, pp 65-96, 
especially 87-91; J. Kratochvil, 'The inflation of the margin of appre~iation by the European 
Court of Human Rights', 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human ~ights 3 (2~11), 324-5?; 
Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism, note 2 above, pp 140-43; Y. Ara1-Takahash1, The Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principl~ of Proport~onality in th~ J~risprude~ce of the ECHR 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2002); E. Brems, The margm of appreciation do~trme 1~ the c.ase-
law of the European Court of Human Rights', 56 Zeitschrift far Ausliindisches Offentliches 
Recht und VOlkerrecht ( 1996), 240-314; R. MacDonald, 'The margin of appreciation' in R. 
MacDonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of 
Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp 83-124. 
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direction different from the one chosen by a given state. 77 Here, the mutual 
v~lidation. and legitimation among democratic states alluded to in the pre-
v10us sect10n also applies to the level of human rights interpretation and 
specification. The joint interpretative endeavour of all democratic domes-
tic authorities leads indeed to the gradual constitution of an international 
interpretation and specification for a given human right, albeit a minimal 
and abstract one. Once there is such a consensual minimal interpretation 
among most domestic authorities, it may be recognised by international 
human rights institutions themselves and thus become consolidated and 
~ntrenched at the international level. The evolutionary nature of this joint 
mterpretative process is sometimes referred to as 'dynamic interpretation' 
f . . al h . 78 o mternat10n uman nghts law. And the joint and mutual process of 
human rights interpretation among domestic and international human 
rights institutions is sometimes called 'judicial dialogue'.79 Once identi-
fied, that minimal human rights interpretation can then be reimposed 
on domestic authorities. This is what is often referred to as the inter-
pretative authority or erga omnes effect of an international human rights 
interpretation or decision. 80 
Importantly, however, those minimal international interpretations can 
only be. more protective and never less protective than the conflicting 
domestic one; they entrench interpretations to prevent levelling-down but 
never hinder levelling-up.81 This is the point of so-called saving clauses in 
77 
See e.g. L. Helfer, 'Consensus, coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights'· 
26 Cornell International Law Journal (1993), 133-65; K. Dzehtsiarou, 'Does consensu~ 
matter? Legitimacy of European consensus in the case law of the ECtHR', Public Law 
(2011), 534-53. See also Neuman, note 40 above at 1884. 78 
See e.g . . TJ:rer v. United Kingdom (App. No. 5856/72) Series A (1979-80) No. 26. On 
the subs1d1ary nature of its interpretations, see e.g. Burden v. United Kingdom (App. No. 
13378/05) [2008] ECHR 357, para. 42; Hatton v. United Kingdom (App. No. 36022/97) 
[2003] ECHR 338, para. 97. See also Letsas, note 4 above. 79 
See e.g; ~ri~_ch, Beyond Constitutionalism, note 2 above, pp 109-52, 126ff.; L. Wild-
haber, Em Uberdenken des Zustands und der Zukunft des Europaischen Gerichtshofs 
filr Menschenrechte', Europaische Grundrechtezeitschrift 36 (2009), 547-53; E. Lambert ~bdelgawad, Le; effets des arr~ts de la Cour europeenne des droits de l'homme (Brussels: 
80 
Etablissements Emile Bruylant, 1999), pp 331-4. 
See e.g. Besson, 'Erga omnes effect', note 53 above; J. Christoffersen 'Individual and constitut~onal just!ce: c~n ~he power balance of adjudication be revers~d?' (pp 204-29) ~nd L. W~dhaber, Rethmking the European Court of Human Rights' (pp 181-203), both 
m J. Chnstoffersen ~~d M. Rask Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights 
81 between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
See, n;iore generally, A. Buchanan, 'Moral progress and human rights' in C. Holder and 
D. Reidy (eds), Human Rights: The Hard Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp 399-417. 
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many international human rights instruments (e.g. Article 53 ECHR).82 
Of course, a domestic institution may still disagree about whether some 
international interpretation provides better protection of a given human 
right than a domestic one. 83 Here, the judicial nature of the interpretative 
authority of international human rights decisions implies that judicial 
distinctions and overruling past decisions may always be possible pro-
vided judicial reasoning across institutional levels leads to that result. 84 
Furthermore, domestic courts may invoke a change in the transnational 
interpretative consensus itself. Thus, the interpretative authority of an 
international human rights institution ought to evolve in step with states' 
margin of appreciation as a two-way street and not simply oppose it, 
as some may fear.85 Moreover, restrictions to human rights may always 
be justified on important grounds and provided the conditions ~f de~o­
cratic necessity are fulfilled. 86 This applies even in circumstances m whKh 
there is a transnational human rights consensus, for instance on contro-
versial moral issues, 87 and even when that consensus has been sanctioned 
with interpretative authority by an international human rights decision 
82 See Neuman, note 40 above at 1886-7. See also van de Heyning, note 76 above.. . 
83 See e.g. Besson, 'Decoupling and recoupling', note 14 above; Buchanan, Justic~, Legit-
imacy, and Self-Determination, note 61 above, pp 180-86. ~ontra: E. Br~ms, Human 
rights: minimum and maximum perspectives', 9 Human Rights Law Review 3 (2009), 
343-72. . 
84 See e.g. Besson, 'Erga omnes effect', note 53 above. See e.g. in the United Kingdom, the 
House ofLords' decision in R. v. Lyons [2002] UKHL 44, [2002] WLR 1562, 1580, 1584, 
1595 that was confirmed later by the ECtHR in Lyons and others v. United Kingdom 
(App. No. 15227/03) ECHR 2003-IX. See also Zand others v. United Kingdom (App. No. 
29392/95) ECHR 2001-V, confirming a British decision (Barrett v. Enfield LBC [1999] 
UKHL 25, [2001] 2 ACC550) that had been intentionally decided against the European 
Court's decision in Osman v. United Kingdom (App. No. 23452/94). Most recently, see 
also ECtHR, Av. United Kingdom (App. No. 3455/05) [2009] ECHR 301. See also Besson, 
'Reception of the ECHR', note 59 above; Besson, 'Supranational judicial review', not~ 33 
above, p. 129; Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism, note 2 above, pp 134ff.; van de Heynmg, 
note 76 above, pp 91-4; Christoffersen, note 80 above, pp 198-200. 
85 See Wildhaber, 'Ein Oberdenken', note 79 above, and 'Rethinking the European Court 
of Human Rights', note 80 above, pp 215-7 on interpretation at the ECtHR_ not 
being a 'one-way street'. See also van de Heyning, note 76 above, pp 90-91; Knsch, 
Beyond Constitutionalism, note 2 above, p. 143; Lambert Abdelgawad, note 79 above, 
pp 331-4. 
86 On this second meaning of the margin of appreciation in the ECtHR's case law (the first 
being the equivalent to the material or substantive subsidiar_ity alluded to b~fore), see e.g. 
G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
87 See e.g. Stiibingv. Germany (App. No. 43547/08) 12 April 2012, nyr; ECtHR, A, Band Cv. 
Ireland (App. No. 25579/05) [2010] ECtHR 2032. 
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or judgme?t. ~in~lly, if savin~ clauses and judicial dialogue seem too risky 
a.perspective m view of certam, potential, structural violations of human 
nghts, states ~ave the possibility of devising interpretative declarations or 
~ven r~servattons to certain human rights in order to favour their estab-
lished mterpretations when acceding to a human rights instrument. 88 
Importantly, however, those may not be devised later, after new interpre-
tations have arisen. 
. What t~is m~ans for the idea of alleged pluralism of human rights 
mterpretat10ns m Europe, however, is that legal pluralism alone is not an 
adequate.mod~! to capture the way in which complementary and distinct 
hum~n ngh~s mterpretations relate in case of conflict. The model does 
perceive the immediate validity and lack of hierarchy among international 
or European and domestic human rights norms, but misses the mutuality 
and reciprocal validation and legitimation process at stake. There is much 
m?r~ than judicial politics and dialogue at play, if one is to explain the 
existmg ~rocesses of mutual interpretation and reasoning. 89 There are 
reasons: I~ othe~ words, behind international or European judges' and 
domestIC Judges cooperation, reasons that go beyond judicial attitudes 
and s~rategies and their mutual respect for each other's beliefs. 
This do~s not mean, however, that human rights adjudication is merely 
ab~ut findmg the right determination of human rights in each adjudi-
catio~ body ~nd independently of what the other domestic or Euro-
pean/I~ternat~onal human rights courts have said, as Letsas argues.90 
~here is n.o r~ght determination of the scope and allocation of human 
nghts duties m circumstances of widespread and persistent moral di~­
agreemen~ and de.e~ indeter~inacy about human rights, except for a 
democratically legitimate one m the community to which belong those 
me~bers w~~se rights and duties are at stake. Of course, that demo-
cratICally legitimate, collective determination may then be questioned in 
court, and before many different courts including international or Euro-
pean ones. However, as I argued earlier, the democratic dimension of 
~uman rights implies that international human rights bodies may only 
mterp~et human rights in cooperation with domestic democratic ones. 
Th~re is therefore a third way that lies between human rights pluralism 
stricto sensu and Letsas's 'harmonic law'. 
88 See Neuman, note 40 above at 1888-90. 
89 
This is something that the pluralist account ofKrisch, 'Open architecture' note 3 above at 
215, cannot explain on its own. ' 
90 See Letsas, 'Harmonic law', note 4 above. 
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2.4. Human rights in response to legal pluralism in Europe 
Besides European human rights' own legal pluralism, human rights are 
also related to European legal pluralism in a second and distinct way. 
This is the role human rights are seen to play in the judicial settlement 
of normative conflicts that stems from the legal pluralism prevailing in 
other areas of European law. 
Increasingly, human rights are used as common standards for adjudi-
cating normative conflicts in the EU. They allegedly provide a basis for 
the common 'identity' or 'equivalence' of the overlapping legal orders in 
Europe and enable those legal orders to 'communicate' on that basis.91 
Evidence of this may also be found in European judicial decisions that 
refer to the equivalence of human rights guarantees stemming from the 
different legal orders applying in an actual case.92 The argument seems 
to be that, if the legal orders from which the conflicting legal norms stem 
entail equivalent human rights norms, the prima fade normative conflicts 
may no longer need to be regarded as conflicts. 
Renewed references to human rights as the solution or part of the solu-
tion to legal pluralism in Europe do not come without difficulties, how-
ever. First, the multilevel and multisourced guarantees of human rights 
have given rise to what I have referred to before as human rights plu-
rality. And that plurality is in the way of a settlement of normative 
conflicts themselves generated by a plurality of legal norms. To start 
with, when different legal orders overlap, usually their respective human 
rights guarantees also overlap. The EU legal order is a case in point with 
ECHR rights, EU fundamental rights and domestic fundamental rights 
overlapping. Even when overlapping legal orders do not contain their 
own human rights legal regime because some of them are specialised, 
human rights are usually interpreted differently from one political con-
text and from one judicial body to the next. The ECHR is an example: its 
91 See e.g. the chapters by Maduro, by Champeil-Desplats and by Azoulai, in Dubout and 
Touze, note 5 above. 
92 See e.g. Case C--127/07 Arce/or At/antique [2008] ECR 1-9895; Case C--213/07 Michaniki 
AB [2008] ECR 1-9999. See also, for the latest example of the corresponding practice of 
domestic courts, e.g. the German Federal Constitutional Court case, Lissabonvertrag, 2/08 
BVerfGE 5/08, para. 340. See also Kumm, note 4 above; Maduro, 'Three claims', note 2 
above. Authors (e.g. Azoulai, note 5 above) usually also include the ECtHR's equivalence 
presumption in Bosphorus (Bosphorus v. Ireland (App. No. 45036/98) ECHR 2005-VI; 
confirmed in Michaud v. France (App. No. 12323/11) ECHR 2012-VI). As I will argue, 
however, the equivalence test used in Bosphorus is of another kind and ought not to be 
conflated with the Arce/or and Lissabonvertrag tests. 
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interpretation varies depending on the context of application and the 
jurisdiction. Finally, within the same legal order, human rights often have 
many sources without clear hierarchies between those sources. This is the 
case in the EU where EU fundamental rights find their sources in general 
principles ofEU law, in EU primary law and in EU secondary law. It is still 
unclear, however, which of these should take priority in cases of conflict 
(see e.g. Article 6(3) TEU; Article 53 Charter). 
Second, even when it is clear which human rights apply within each legal 
order and one finds the same human rights within different overlapping 
legal orders, it would be wrong to assume that they are equivalent norms 
that ~an be compared and hence be deemed equivalent. Human rights are 
not hke other abstract legal norms, and their legal guarantees at different 
legal levels do not have the same function. 93 
On one hand, human rights, when they are legally recognised, are not 
legal norms like any other. To start with, they are non-functional norms 
in that they cannot be said to fulfil the same function in every legal 
order. Their function differs from one domestic legal order to another. 
They are indeed an essential part of the mutual recognition of political 
equality among members of the polity, but because polities differ, the exact 
~nction of human rights varies accordingly. 94 In this respect, human 
nghts cannot be described as multi-source equivalent norms (MSENs)9s 
the way the principles of proportionality or non-discrimination could. 
Further~ore, legal human rights cannot even be regarded as legal 
norms stricto sensu, at least in the abstract. A human right exists qua 
moral right when an interest is a sufficient ground or reason to hoid 
someone else (the duty-bearer) under a (categorical and exclusionary) 
duty to respect that interest vis-a-vis the right holder.96 For a right to be 
recog~ised, a sufficient interest must be established and weighed against 
other mterests and other considerations with which it might conflict in a 
particular social context.97 Rights, in this conception, are intermediaries 
93 
On the specificities of legal human rights, see S. Besson, 'Human rights: ethical, politi-
cal, ... or legal? first steps in a legal theory of human rights' in D. E. Childress III (ed.), 
The Role of Ethics in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20ll), 
pp 2ll-45. 
94 Ibid. 
95 
Y. Sha~'. and T. Broude, 'The international law and policy of multi-sourced equivalent 
norms m Shany and Broude (eds), Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), pp 1-18. 
:; J. Raz, 'On the nature of rights', 93 Mind (1984), 194-214 at 195. 
Ibid., at 200, 209. 
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between interests and duties. 98 It follows, first of all, that a right may be 
recognised and protected before specifying which duties correspond to 
it.99 Once a duty is specified, it will correlate to the (specific) right, but 
the right might already exist in the abstract without its specific duties 
being identified. The relationship between rights and particular duties is 
justificatory therefore, and not logical. 100 As a result, determining who 
bears the duty in relation to a right and the exact content of that duty are 
not conditions for the existence of a moral right. 101 A right, secondly, is 
a sufficient ground for holding other individuals as owing all the duties 
necessary to protect the interest, regardless of the details of those duties. 102 
It follows that a right might provide for the imposition of many duties 
and not just one. Rights actually have a dynamic nature and, as such, 
successive specific duties can be grounded on a given right depending on 
the circumstances.103 In short, it is only in local circumstances that the 
allocation and specification of duties may take place. 
What this means is that legal human rights only give rise to duties 
in a specific context. It is only then that one may say there is a human 
rights norm at work. As a result, they cannot be compared abstractly and 
cannot be deemed equivalent before they apply to a specific case. For 
instance, even if a human right is protected both qua EU fundamental 
right and qua domestic fundamental right, it will only bear duties in a 
domestic context once applied to a specific case and there will only be one 
normative requirement as a result. This actually explains why it is difficult 
to know in practice when an ECHR right is better protected by EU law 
than by the ECHR or when an ECHR right 'corresponds' to a domestic or 
an EU fundamental right along the lines of Article 53 ECHR or Articles 
52(3) and 53 Charter.104 
On the other hand, another difficulty with the idea of human rights 
equivalence is that human rights' legal guarantees do not have the same 
function at different legal levels, as I argued earlier. International and 
98 Ibid., at 208. 
99 See N. MacCormick, 'Rights in legislation' in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds), Law, 
Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), p. 201. 
100 See ibid., pp 199-202; Raz, note 96 above at 196, 200. 
101 See also J. Tasioulas, 'The moral reality of human rights' in T. Pogge (ed.), Freedom from 
Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), pp 75-101. 
102 See J. Waldron, 'Introduction' in Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), pp 10-11. 
103 See Raz, note 96 above at 197-9. 104 See van de Heyning, note 76 above. 
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national human rights guarantees cannot be deemed equivalent, as a 
result. The same may be said about regional human rights guarantees 
such as European human rights. It would be wrong therefore to compare 
EU fundamental rights, ECHR rights and domestic fundamental rights 
even when they all apply to the same specific case. 
This difference in function between international or European and 
domestic human rights by reference to their institutional and political role 
reveals ~ow misguid~d it would be to assimilate European human rights 
to? ~eaddy to d~mestic fundamental rights. 105 ECHR rights guarantee the 
mm1mum reqmrements to be respected by a European democratic society. 
They are guaranteed internationally, outside any democratic polity and 
have to be transposed into European democratic legal orders. By contrast, 
EU fun~amental rights are the rights of a democratic polity albeit of a 
post-nat10nal and complex nature. This explains their hybrid nature: they 
play an external, minimal role of the kind the ECHR plays in domestic legal 
orders, but they also have a municipal dimension that pertains to the EU 
democratic polity. Their multiple sources and bottom-up nature reflect 
t?at hybrid ~at~re. 106 This difference in nature among European human 
nghts explams m turn why the relationship between the interpretations 
of ECHR rights and domestic rights cannot be the same as that between 
interpretations of EU fundamental rights and domestic rights, nor, as 
a result, between interpretations of ECHR rights and EU fundamental 
rights, the latter being doubly subsidiary to the former. 107 
In vie~ of those argume~ts, it would be wrong to assume that European 
human nghts may be eqmvalent across the domestic, the EU and the 
Coun~il of Europe legal orders, not only in an abstract way but also in 
a specific case. And even if they were, it remains unclear why this would 
be of any relevance to the relationship between norms stemming from 
different legal orders. 
. I~ this l~tter respect, there are two categories that are usually conflated 
m d1~cuss10ns of the equivalence of European human rights. ros In the 
first mstance, the normative conflict may be a conflict between human 
105 
In this ~ense, I differ from Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation, note 86 above. See also 
Besson, Erga omnes effect', note 53 above. 
106 
See Besson, 'Decoupling and Recoupling', note 14 above. 
107 ~ee e.g. Be~son, 'Supranational judicial review', note 33 above. For confirmation of the 
~nterpretation of Art. 53 of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter (that it should not be 
mterpr~ted along the lines of the saving clause in Art. 53 ECHR), see Case C-399/11 
108 Mellom, nyr, para. 60; and Case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson, nyr, para. 29. 
See e.g. Letsas, 'Harmonic law', note 4 above. 
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rights guarantees themselves. It may be a conflict between two or many 
human rights stemming from different legal orders or, most co~monly, 
one between incompatible interpretations of the same human nghts or 
restrictions to the same human rights. This is the kind of case in which 
the relationship between EU fundamental rights and ECHR rights has 
been raised and for which the equivalence presumption in Bosphorus 
was first elaborated. 109 These are the cases I discussed in the previous 
section. In the second category, which is the most common, the nor-
mative conflict is not about human rights, but the latter are invoked as 
part of its resolution. This category corresponds to the vast m~jority of 
cases in which the relationship between EU law and domestic funda-
mental rights has been raised, and for which the equivalence test devel-
oped by the German Federal Constitutipnal Court in the ':~ke of Solange 
II, 110 and by the ECJ/CJEU in its Michaniki or Arcelor declSlons were put 
forward. 111 
Clearly, the idea of human rights equivalence is different in those ~o 
categories of cases. In the former, it is a judicial test aimed ~t ~ll?catmg 
jurisdiction over certain parts of EU law. In the latter case, while 1t 1s also a 
judicial test, it is not directly aimed at allocating jurisdi~tion and d?~s not 
pertain solely to monitoring human rights, but at testi~g the l:g1tim.ate 
authority of EU norms and their primacy over domestic law, mcludmg 
constitutional rights. Qua test oflegitimacy, human rights equivalence is 
not about 'communication' between legal orders, 112 therefore. It is about 
authorising the immediate validity and the primacy of E~ law withi.n the 
domestic legal order including its primacy over domestic human nghts. 
This explains why it would be wrong to conflate too quickly the Solange II 
equivalence test with the presumption of equivalence used by the ECtHR 
in Bosphorus. The former is about testing the legitimacy of.legal n?rms 
that claim immediate validity and primacy within domestic law m an 
integrated legal order, that of the EU, while the latter is ~bout a~loca~ing 
between two courts jurisdictional power over human nghts v10lat10ns 
that only partially belong within the jurisdiction of one of them, hence 
the problem. . 
In sum, a more careful and informed approach to the funct10n of 
various human rights guarantees in Europe shows how the reference t? 
human rights as a solution to legal pluralism merely obscures what 1s 
109 Bosphorus, note 92 above. 110 BVerfGE, Solange II73, 339 (1986). 
111 Arcelor, note 92 above; Michaniki, note 92 above. 
112 On this notion, see Azoulai, note 5 above. 
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really at stake in circumstances of legal pluralism. This has to do with 
a. misunderstanding of both the function of different European human 
nghts norms and their role in European adjudication. 
. If human rights ~lay a role in the articulation oflegal orders in the EU, it 
1~ as part of the basis for a legal order's claim to legitimacy in a given polity. 
?mce the European polity is a complex one that entails many demoi, the 
idea of h~man righ~s pluralism reflects its democratic complexity. While 
human nghts are rightly a part of that legitimacy test, they are not the 
o.nly one. This is why the Solange II test should be regarded as a much 
ncher one than authors are usually ready to concede.113 As confirmed 
by recent revivals of that test in the caselaw of the Czech Constitutional 
Court, d~mocr~cy is as important a component of political legitimacy as 
human nghts smce the two go hand in hand.114 
3. European legal pluralism redux 
Followin~ the above considerations about the relationship between 
~uman nghts and democracy, it is interesting to return to the ques-
tion· o·f European legal pluralism in order to assess it from an angle more 
sensitive to human rights cum democracy. 
L:gal_r~uralism in both meanings discussed in the first section, i.e. qua 
plunvahd1ty and qua heterarchy, should not too readily be ascribed across 
the board, to all relationships between legal orders and to all legal orders. 
Issues oflegal validity and of rank between legal orders are not contingent 
matters of fact, and o~ght to reflect key positions on the legitimacy oflegal 
orde~s.and norms. It Is only by distinguishing more carefully between the 
cond1t10ns for legitimacy of international, European and national law, and 
between question~ of v~idity and rank, that we can propose a convincing 
model of the relationship between legal orders in the EU. 
While pluralism may be the right model to capture the integrated nature 
of the EU legal or~er, 11 ~ I would l~ke to argue that it is not to the right 
model for the relat10nsh1p between mternational law and European law or 
113 Solange II, note llO above. 
114 C h C . . 1 
zec onst1tutiona Court, Sugar Quota Regulation II, judgment of 8 March 2006, Pl 
US 50/04 or Europea~ Ar:est Warrant, judgment of 3 May 2006, Pl US 66/04. See most 
recently, Czech Const1tut10nal Court, Landtova, judgment of 14 February 2012 Pl US ~112: For a confirmation, see the reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
m Ltssabonsvertrag, note 92 above. 
115 See B 'H . · al' esson, ow mternat1on , note 1 above, pp 12-15. 
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between international law and domestic law. Legal validity is shorthand 
for a claim to legitimacy and ought to entail the possibility for that 
claim to obtain. 116 The autonomy of a legal order is not a merely legal 
phenomenon, but the reflection of a political reality: the polity'.s self-
determination. As a result, not all legal orders can be deemed as eqmvalent 
and likewise their relationships cannot be organised in a comparable 
fashion, especially when their subjects are individuals and states, or just 
individuals. 
The very refined demoi-cratic regime that was developed within t?e 
European legal order during the past thirty years can account for the leg1~­
imacy of EU law. 117 It justifies a pluralist relationship betwe:n ?ome~tic 
and EU law within the European legal order. 118 Democratic mclus10n 
might be best guaranteed, depending on the cases, .at the Europea.n 
level and this may grant certain EU law norms a higher democratic 
legitimacy.119 The same may be said about human rights w~thin th: EU; 
EU fundamental rights developed in two stages, first qua mternational 
and then qua transnational human rights, to enable the development 
of EU democratic credentials and hence to justify EU law's immedi-
ate validity within domestic legal orders and its claim to primacy over 
domestic law. The specificity of their bottom-up sources and the lack 
of EU human rights competence are characteristic of a form of human 
rights protection that amounts to more than minimal an~ externa~ inter-
national human rights guarantees while, at the same time, avoids the 
substitution of an EU set of human rights for the domestic ones. There 
is a form of EU human rights pluralism, in other words, that backs up 
the legal pluralism that prevails in the EU legal order qua integrated legal 
order. 
116 See Besson, 'Democratic authority', note 68 above. See also Somek, note 30 above. . . 
111 Sees. Besson, 'Deliberative demoi-cracy in the European Union: towards the deterntor.1-
alization of democracy' in S. Besson and J. L. Marti (eds), Deliberative Democracy and tts 
Discontents (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp 181-214. 
11s See Besson, 'How international', note 1 above; Besson, 'European legal pluralism', note 2 
above. 
119 See for an illustration of the link between fundamental rights and democracy, on one 
hand, and of the relations between different levels of democratic government, the rich 
test one may find in the reasoning of the Czech Constitutional Court in the 2006 Sug~r 
Quota Regulation II or in the 2006 European Arrest Warrant (both note 114 above). It is 
particularly striking when contrasted with the Solange I or II tests used by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court: the latter focus only on fundamental rights and conceive 
of the national polity as the only source of democratic legitimacy. 
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Of course, the emergence of a third stage in the EU human rights regime 
qua municipal human rights regime after Lisbon currently questions 
this. status quo. 120 This is why one may argue, as I have in the previous 
section, that the relationship between domestic fundamental rights and 
~U fundamental rights is now organised in an increasingly different fash-
10n .than that between domestic fundamental rights and ECHR rights, 
for mstance. Unsurprisingly, this development has occurred alongside 
the development of the principle of political equality in EU law (Article 9 
TEU); as always, democracy and human rights develop hand in hand and, 
~ith the cons~lidation of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, the special 
~nd of demoi-cracy we have had in Europe in the past is clearly turning 
mto ~~ore municipal albeit federalist kind of democracy. 
. .This ts ~ot (yet) the case at the international level, however. Not only 
ts mternat10nal human rights protection deficient, but it does not serve 
the same function as fundamental rights protection within the EU. More 
importantly, international lawmaking lacks the democratic dimension 
necessary to back a claim to immediate validity and to constitutional 
rank within the European legal order. 121 Paying due attention to that 
democratic requirement appears even more essential in an integrated 
legal order where validity in EU law also implies immediate validity within 
Member States' national legal orders and democratic polities. 
So, while European legal pluralism could be defended as the model 
of the relationship between domestic and European law that can best 
be justifie? on gro~nds of democratic legitimacy, that very legitimacy 
also explams why 1t cannot constitute the most legitimate model for 
the relationship between European (and domestic) law and international 
law. One cannot rule out, of course, the possibility that the international leg~l order, or the UN regime at least, might at some time develop into 
an mternal legal order with transnational dimensions on the model of 
the European legal order. This would, however, require accepting even 
deeper changes within national democracies than what has taken place 
in the EU since 1957.122 This is why the ECJ was right not to follow 
120 
See Besson, 'Decoupling and recoupling', note 14 above. See also the CJEU's decision in 
Melloni (note 107 above). 
121 
See my critique of the Advocate General's opinion in Kadi (note 15 above) in this respect: 
Besson, 'How international', note I above, pp 12-17. 
122 
On. those challenges, see S. Besson, 'Ubi ius, ibi civitas: a republican account of the inter-
national com:111unity' in S .. Besson and J. L. Marti (eds), Legal Republicanism: National 
and International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp 205-37; 
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Advocate General Maduro in the Kadi case;123 there is more at stake in the 
relationship between international law and EU law in terms of p~litical 
legitimacy than in the relationship between EU law and. dom~stl~ law. 
And neither can the Solange II test be applied to that relat1onsh1p simply 
by analogy with what prevails in the relationship between EU law and 
domestic law.124 
Interestingly, international law includes the ECHR re~ime. The ~C.HR 
remains indeed a regional albeit international law regime and distmct 
from the integrated legal order of the EU and its Member States. As 
a result, and as I argued earlier, the relationship between EU law and 
ECHR rights cannot be described only along the strict lines of the legal 
pluralist model. Nor can that between ECHR rights and EU Member 
States' legal orders. Of course, European human rights, like inte~na~ional 
human rights, are legitimised through reception and cont~xtuahsatt.o? as 
domestic or municipal human rights within the domestic or mumc1pal 
legal order. And this turns their validity and rank into a constit~tional 
matter, as discussed previously. All this, and what was pr~sented m pre-
vious sections about the respective nature and role of different human 
rights guarantees depending on the level o~ guaran~ee, explains why the 
relationship between human rights norms 1s a special case, compared to 
that between other legal norms stemming from different legal orders and 
hence from legal pluralism as it has been understood so far. 
One should emphasise that the relationship between the ECHR ~nd 
EU fundamental rights will now go through a process o~ reconfig~rat10n 
in the context of the EU's accession to the ECHR. While one might be 
tempted to see accession as marking the continuation of the Bosphor~s 
test the argument made in this chapter has hopefully demonstrated that it 
will toll that test's knell. 125 The negotiations aiming at the EU's accession 
to the ECHRhave awakened the sore question of the Union's human rights 
s. Besson, 'Institutionalizing global demoi-cracy' in L. H. Me~er (~d.), Justice, Legiti-
macy and Public International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Umvers1ty Press, 2009), PP 
58-91. . . [2005] 
123 AG Maduro, Kadi, note 15 above; Case T-315/01, Kadiv. Council and Commission . 
ECR-11 3649. See also Case T-85/09 Kadi v. Commission [20 IO] ECR 11-5177. T.he dualism 
between international law and EU law has been confirmed by Case C-366/ I 0 Atr Transport 
Association of America, nyr. 
124 See my critique of the Advocate General's opinion in Kadi (note 15 above, para. 22ff.): 
Besson 'How international', note I above, pp 12-17. 
125 See als~ o. de Schutter, 'L'adhesion de !'Union europeenne a la Con~entio~ europeen~e 
d d ·ts de l'homme: Feuille de route de la negociation', 21 Revue tnmestnelle des drotts 
es rm ' d . . . M' h d de /'Homme 83 (2010), 535-72 at 544, 565. See also the ECtHRs ecmon m tc au 
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competence precisely because it implies a shift from the current, hybrid, 
human rights regime that applies in the EU towards a more municipal 
model of human rights. 126 And this also means entering a new stage 
in the political and democratic development of the EU. In this context, 
the relationship between the EU legal order and its Member States' legal 
orders will change, but so will that between the CJEU and the ECtHR 
pertaining to human rights as a result. The CJEU's human rights review 
of domestic law will have to become bolder and more coherent, while the 
ECtHR's human rights review of EU law will have to come closer to the 
subsidiary review it ought to be applying in its relationship to domestic 
courts and hence less subsidiary than it has been since the Bosphorus 
presumption was adopted. 
4. Conclusion 
Domestic legal orders match domestic political communities. This reali-
sation affects their autonomy and hence their relationship to other legal 
orders, whether domestic and hence democratic or regional and interna-
tional. 
Trying to understand and handle European legal pluralism by abstract-
ing from normative political theory and without taking into account 
the political differences between those orders is doomed to fail. Recent 
attempts to do this by reference to values instead of democracy, and 
through human rights equivalence and judicial comity only, are evidence 
of that failure. While human rights adjudication is a privileged point of 
contact between norms stemming from different European legal orders, 
it is not the only one. And it can only perform its role if one takes into 
account the institutional and political context of the norms and institu-
tions European judges are monitoring. 
With respect to human rights more specifically, I hope to have shown 
how complex those legal norms are and how little we are in fact say-
ing when we refer to 'human rights pluralism'. European human rights 
guarantees are both plural and complementary at the same time: their 
plurality gives rise to a richer form of pluralism than that between other 
(note 92 above). More generally on the accession negotiations, see http://hub.coe.int/en/ 
what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention/. 126 
See Besson, 'Decoupling and recoupling', note 14 above; S. Besson, 'The human rights 
competence in the EU - the state of the question after Lisbon' in G. Kofler, M. P. Maduro 
andP. Pistone (eds), Human Rights and Taxation in Europe and the World, The 5th GREIT 
Conference (Amsterdam: IBFD, 201l), pp 37-63. 
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1 1 . a kind of pluralism that is characterised by mutuality, ega norms, I.e. · 1 d etition 
both in validity and legitimation, and not by eqmva ence an comp . 
11 
· 
The reasons have to do with the polit~cal function and the democratlca y 
le itimating role of human rights. It IS those reasons we need to foc~s on n~w since they are channeling the future of democracy and human n~hts prot~ction in the EU, bu~ we also might one day need to focus on t em 
in our international relations. 
